In a major boost to ongoing peace efforts in violence-hit Manipur, the Indian Army, in close coordination with Assam Rifles, Manipur Police, CRPF, and BSF, has apprehended 29 insurgent cadres and seized 28 weapons during a series of joint intelligence-based operations conducted from May 13 to May 18, 2025. The operations spanned multiple volatile districts, including Churachandpur, Thoubal, Bishnupur, Kakching, Senapati, Imphal East, and Imphal West.
The recovered cache includes automatic rifles, pistols, grenades, improvised mortars, large quantities of ammunition, and other warlike stores. Visuals from the operation show a display of the seized arms laid out on a green tablecloth bearing the Indian Army insignia, alongside personnel conducting search missions in forested terrain and documenting the evidence at police facilities.
This latest crackdown comes amid the ongoing ethnic conflict that erupted in Manipur in 2023 following a controversial “Tribal Solidarity March” in Churachandpur. The unrest has resulted in over 260 fatalities, mass displacement, and widespread destruction of homes and public property. Armed violence and the illegal proliferation of sophisticated weapons have continued to plague the state, despite periodic curfews and administrative interventions.
— SpearCorps.IndianArmy (@Spearcorps) May 19, 2025
Local law enforcement played a critical role in the operation, with notable handovers of arrested individuals and recovered materials taking place at Kakching Police Station. Officials confirmed that all detainees and seized items have been transferred to Manipur Police for further legal proceedings.
This operation builds on a similar effort in October 2024, when 26 high-grade weapons, including M16 rifles, were recovered in Imphal East and Churachandpur. The repeated discovery of such advanced arms points to an alarming trend of militarization within local conflict zones.
Security officials stressed the importance of inter-agency coordination in tackling insurgency and maintaining law and order. “The success of these joint operations reflects the commitment of all involved forces to restore peace and protect civilians,” a senior Army official stated.
As Manipur continues to navigate a complex path toward reconciliation and stability, such decisive security actions underscore the resolve of Indian forces to neutralize threats, dismantle militant infrastructure, and promote lasting peace in the region.
Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Anil Chauhan paid a significant visit to two of India’s most strategically located military installations—Suratgarh Military Station in Rajasthan and Naliya Air Force Station in Gujarat. These forward bases, situated near the volatile India–Pakistan border, played a pivotal role in the recently concluded Operation Sindoor. The CDS’s visit came as a high-level gesture of appreciation and recognition for the critical contributions of the armed forces in executing a swift and decisive response to threats emanating from across the border.
Operation Sindoor, launched earlier this month, was a precision strike mission aimed at dismantling cross-border terrorist infrastructure. The operation was carefully calibrated to neutralize identified targets with minimal collateral damage and maximum tactical impact. It has since been hailed as a major success, sending a clear message about India’s willingness and capability to respond to provocations with strength and resolve. The CDS’s visit, timed shortly after the conclusion of this operation, served both as a morale booster for the troops and a reaffirmation of India’s uncompromising stance on national security.
Chief of Defence Staff, General Anil Chauhan lauds air warriors' exceptional valour and professionalism in #OperationSindoor during his visit to Air Force Station Naliya. #CDS commended the Air Force and Army Air Defence units for displaying exceptional courage and grit in… pic.twitter.com/ePBdU188xT
General Chauhan interacted with officers and jawans deployed at both stations and expressed deep appreciation for their courage, discipline, and operational excellence. He underscored the critical role these bases played not only in the execution of Operation Sindoor but also in sustaining India’s strategic deterrence posture along the western front. Naliya Air Force Station, located barely 90 kilometers from the sensitive Sir Creek region, holds particular strategic significance due to its proximity to contested maritime boundaries and its role in securing India’s western coastline. Suratgarh, meanwhile, serves as a key staging ground for ground-based operations and integrated force mobilization in the desert theatre.
Photographs from the visit depicted General Chauhan standing with large contingents of troops, many of whom were positioned in front of India’s legacy air defence platforms, including the 2K12 Kub (NATO designation: SA-6 Gainful) surface-to-air missile systems. These Soviet-era systems, originally inducted decades ago, remain in service and continue to provide medium-range air defence coverage along the western sector. Although the 2K12 Kub’s performance in historical conflicts such as the Gulf War has been debated—with limited success against modern coalition aircraft—it still serves as a deterrent and layered component of India’s evolving air defence architecture.
The CDS acknowledged the need for continuous technological upgradation, but also noted the dedication and ingenuity of Indian troops in maximizing the operational utility of legacy platforms. He emphasized the importance of force readiness, interoperability, and adaptation in the face of evolving threats, particularly from state-sponsored terrorism and asymmetric warfare tactics.
In his address, General Chauhan urged personnel to remain vigilant, physically prepared, and mentally alert in view of the unpredictable security dynamics along the border. He also commended the synergy and coordination displayed by the Army and the Air Force during the execution of Operation Sindoor, calling it a model for future joint operations. His remarks reinforced the government’s commitment to equipping the armed forces with the resources and capabilities they need, while also honoring the indomitable spirit of Indian soldiers who serve in challenging environments.
The visit to Suratgarh and Naliya was not merely ceremonial—it served as a strong message to adversaries that India remains fully prepared to defend its sovereignty with resolve and clarity. It also reaffirmed the trust and support of the military leadership in the abilities of frontline troops who stand guard at some of the most sensitive borders in the world. With regional tensions continuing to simmer, the CDS’s outreach highlighted the importance of constant preparedness, technological modernization, and unwavering commitment to national security.
The Army War College (AWC) in Mhow inaugurated a new session of its flagship Junior Command Course today, marking a significant step in preparing mid-level officers for modern operational challenges. Lt Gen Harjeet Singh Sahi, who took over as Commandant in August 2024, formally welcomed the incoming batch comprising officers from the Indian Army, Central Armed Police Forces, and allied foreign militaries.
In his keynote address, Lt Gen Sahi underscored the importance of adapting to evolving security threats, particularly in the cyber domain, which he described as a critical battlefield in contemporary conflicts. He outlined a forward-looking vision for the college, focusing on enhanced tactical training, inter-agency coordination, and fostering a culture of strategic innovation.
Held in a packed auditorium adorned with the institution’s insignia, the ceremony highlighted AWC’s central role in shaping future military leaders. Established in 1971 as the College of Combat and renamed in 2003, the Army War College trains 2,500 to 3,000 officers annually through specialized programs in tactics, logistics, and doctrine. Courses include the Junior Command, Senior Command, Higher Command, and Defence Management programs.
The Junior Command Course is tailored for officers at the captain and major ranks, aiming to build decision-making skills, operational planning capabilities, and leadership acumen required for complex missions. The presence of international officers—approximately 100 join AWC courses each year—demonstrates India’s expanding defence cooperation and the college’s growing global footprint.
Lt Gen Sahi’s leadership comes at a time when global security scenarios are increasingly defined by hybrid threats. Echoing past concerns raised by former Chief of Defence Staff Gen Bipin Rawat, he called for a blend of conventional and cyber strategies in training modules. He also encouraged officers to contribute to the War College Journal, which promotes discourse on military strategy and operational innovation.
As the course gets underway, the Army War College continues to reinforce its stature as a premier institution committed to preparing officers for the multi-dimensional battlefield of the future, while advancing India’s leadership in international military education.
In a significant morale-boosting visit, General Upendra Dwivedi, Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), toured the forward positions of the Indian Army’s Konark Corps in the desert sector to commend troops for their stellar performance during Operation SINDOOR. The operation, spanning from Jaisalmer to Kutch, demonstrated India’s robust defensive preparedness and joint operational capability along its western frontier.
Operation Sindoor, a coordinated effort by the Indian Army, Indian Air Force (IAF), and Border Security Force (BSF), was marked by rapid deployment of surveillance and air defense assets, along with the precise positioning of weapon systems. This unified response neutralized multiple enemy threats, including drone incursions, ensuring complete area domination in a challenging desert terrain.
#GeneralUpendraDwivedi, #COAS today visited #Laungewala, a site where bravery & sacrifice are etched in the nation’s history. He emphasized that the iconic battleground symbolizes the unwavering spirit and valour of the soldiers who defended the motherland against overwhelming… pic.twitter.com/hTvgZLJ3Ap
General Dwivedi acknowledged the critical role of synergy between the armed forces and civil administration in executing the operation with precision and effectiveness. He lauded the professionalism and endurance of the troops, who carried out their duties in extreme temperatures under demanding desert conditions.
Addressing the soldiers at Laungewala—an iconic site of India’s 1971 victory over Pakistan—the Army Chief offered a resounding “Shabash!”, honoring their courage, resilience, and commitment to safeguarding the nation’s borders. His interaction highlighted not only the tactical success of the mission but also the continued legacy of bravery associated with Laungewala.
Emphasizing readiness for future contingencies, General Dwivedi praised the Konark Corps for their integrated planning, swift action, and high morale. He reaffirmed the Indian Army’s focus on maintaining operational superiority and strategic deterrence in an increasingly complex security environment.
Operation Sindoor stands as a testament to India’s growing emphasis on jointness and inter-agency coordination, setting a new standard in integrated defense operations and reinforcing national resolve to defend territorial integrity.
The Siliguri Corridor, often dubbed India’s “Chicken Neck,” is a strategically critical and narrow stretch of land—measuring just 20–25 kilometers wide at its narrowest—that connects the rest of India to its eight northeastern states: Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Manipur, Nagaland, Tripura, and Sikkim. Sandwiched between Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh, this corridor acts as a geopolitical linchpin for India’s sovereignty and internal connectivity. In recent years, with mounting border tensions and China’s deepening influence in the region, this vital corridor has become the centerpiece of India’s security calculus and Beijing’s strategic aspirations. For China, the ability to threaten or disrupt the Siliguri Corridor would not only undermine India’s military and logistical cohesion but also offer a potential leverage point in any conflict scenario.
The origin of the Siliguri Corridor’s vulnerability dates back to the 1947 Partition of British India. The creation of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) carved away most of Bengal’s eastern territories, leaving a thin tract of land connecting mainland India to its eastern frontier. The 1971 Indo-Pak War and the subsequent creation of Bangladesh eased some connectivity issues but introduced a new set of challenges as China began cultivating stronger ties with Dhaka. Over the decades, this corridor has remained a pressure point, with India investing heavily in military installations, border roads, and civilian infrastructure to prevent geopolitical isolation of the northeast. Yet, its geographic slenderness ensures that its strategic fragility remains unresolved.
Strategic Importance of the Siliguri Corridor
Geographically, the Siliguri Corridor is India’s umbilical cord to its northeast. It facilitates the movement of goods, military hardware, civilian populations, and energy supplies across the region. All major railway lines, oil and gas pipelines, and power transmission routes converge here, making it the most critical logistics artery for the northeast. What elevates its strategic gravity is its location—flanked by three countries. To the west lies Nepal, to the north is Bhutan, and to the south is Bangladesh.
Any military disruption or blockade here could sever India’s northeastern states from the mainland, creating a logistical nightmare and an existential crisis in terms of territorial integrity. This makes it a classic “chokepoint”—a geographical vulnerability that, if exploited by an adversary, could trigger a national crisis.
China’s Strategic Calculations
From Beijing’s vantage point, the Siliguri Corridor represents a golden opportunity for coercive leverage over India. China’s Western Theatre Command maintains a strong presence in Tibet, equipped with high-altitude acclimatized troops, advanced artillery systems, and long-range missiles. A rapid maneuver through the Chumbi Valley (near the tri-junction of India, Bhutan, and China) could, in theory, bring Chinese forces within striking distance of the corridor. The 2017 Doklam standoff was a direct result of such an attempt—China’s road-building near the Doklam plateau would have allowed it to dominate the corridor through elevated surveillance and firepower. More recently, China’s infrastructure upgrades near the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and its covert interest in Bangladesh’s Lalmonirhat airbase—just 20 kilometers from the corridor—underscore a clear intention to gradually encircle and pressure the corridor from multiple angles. China’s broader strategy appears to be based on exploiting the corridor’s fragility to coerce India diplomatically or gain the upper hand in a limited conflict.
The strategic targeting of the Siliguri Corridor aligns with China’s evolving military doctrines. Under the “Active Defense” principle, the PLA is trained to strike first if an adversary is perceived to be preparing for aggression. Chokepoints like Siliguri, which can paralyze a nation’s logistics and command networks, are considered high-value targets. Furthermore, China’s “Systems Destruction Warfare” model advocates neutralizing an enemy’s decision-making and logistic backbone, rather than simply winning territory. The corridor’s cramped geography, congested infrastructure, and command-dependent transportation networks make it the perfect example of a system vulnerability. Disabling or threatening this node could deliver asymmetric advantages to China without a full-scale war.
Beijing’s strategic approach to India involves both maritime and land-based encirclement. The “String of Pearls” strategy—comprising ports in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and the Maldives—is complemented by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that stretches across South and Southeast Asia. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the proposed BCIM (Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar) corridor are elements of this design. Siliguri sits at the intersection of this geoeconomic thrust and military ambition. Investments in roads, bridges, and airstrips in Nepal and Bangladesh aren’t merely economic—they serve as dual-use platforms for military logistics and surveillance, inching Beijing closer to India’s jugular.
Chumbi Valley and Dokhlam on Map
India’s Vulnerabilities and Response
India’s greatest liability is the corridor’s geographic and demographic fragility. With over 1.5 million people concentrated in and around Siliguri, the region is densely populated and economically congested. The corridor is narrow enough that a precision strike, a rail disruption, or an airborne landing could cut off the northeast for days—if not weeks. Despite some military modernization, the region still suffers from underdeveloped roads, limited redundancy in logistics pathways, and civilian infrastructure not designed to withstand war-like scenarios. Moreover, India’s northeast continues to be riddled with insurgencies, ethnic fault lines, and political grievances. These internal fissures could be exploited by foreign adversaries or proxy actors to cause unrest, complicating India’s response during a crisis.
India has begun addressing these vulnerabilities through a multi-pronged approach. On the infrastructure front, it is fast-tracking projects like the Shillong-Silchar Expressway, the Sevoke-Rangpo railway line, and the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Project to create alternate connectivity routes through Myanmar. Militarily, India has enhanced its posture with the deployment of the Trishakti Corps, multiple divisions of the Indian Army’s Mountain Strike Corps, and two squadrons of Rafale fighter jets at Hasimara Air Base, just 75 km from the corridor. Surveillance systems, including UAVs and advanced radars, have been installed along key axes. Diplomatically, India has intensified engagements with Bhutan and Bangladesh to counterbalance Chinese influence and maintain favorable border cooperation. Combined arms exercises involving air force, army, and intelligence units are now routine in the corridor’s vicinity.
Shillong-Silchar Expressway Route
Sevoke-Rangpo Railway Line
Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Project
The Bhutan Factor
Bhutan is a critical piece in the corridor’s defense puzzle. The 2017 Doklam crisis stemmed from China’s road construction in Bhutanese territory—territory which overlooks the Siliguri Corridor. Bhutan’s geographical position acts as a buffer between India and Tibet. India’s defense cooperation with Bhutan, which includes military training and joint border monitoring, ensures that Chinese forces are kept at arm’s length from the tri-junction. However, China’s persistent attempts to negotiate territorial concessions in Bhutan, including its proposal for a “package deal,” suggest a long-term strategy to gain physical and political access to Bhutanese plateaus that overlook Indian territory. Maintaining Bhutan’s alignment with Indian security interests is therefore non-negotiable for New Delhi.
Bhutan Acts as Buffer Country
Global and Regional Implications
The strategic contest over the Siliguri Corridor is not just a bilateral issue between India and China—it has far-reaching regional consequences. A Chinese move against the corridor could drag in allies and provoke global attention, particularly from the United States, Japan, and Australia, all of whom are part of the Quad and have interests in maintaining a stable Indo-Pacific. Bangladesh’s increasing alignment with China through infrastructure and defense ties, including potential dual-use facilities, could create a pincer scenario for India. In a larger war, the corridor could serve as the first domino, triggering wider regional instability and global economic disruptions, especially in the Bay of Bengal and eastern Himalayas.
Local Dynamics and Demographics
Siliguri is not just a geopolitical asset—it is a living, breathing urban center. Its demographic composition includes Bengalis, Gorkhas, Biharis, and tribal communities, each with distinct identities and histories. Ethnic grievances, if manipulated, could erupt into unrest, providing cover for anti-national activities or external interference. The city’s infrastructure is overstretched; population growth and unregulated urbanization have choked transport arteries. This congestion is not just an economic problem—it becomes a strategic liability in emergencies, as it impedes rapid mobilization and evacuation efforts.
Technological and Cyber Vulnerabilities
The modern battlefield is not limited to guns and boots—it includes bytes and bandwidth. Chinese reconnaissance satellites have revisit times as low as four hours, enabling near-real-time surveillance of troop movements through Siliguri. Fiber-optic cables running through Nepal and Bangladesh, built with Chinese collaboration, raise fears of communication intercepts. PLA-linked cyber units routinely probe India’s transportation systems, targeting command networks and logistics chains. In a hybrid war scenario, disabling digital infrastructure could be as effective as a physical blockade of the corridor, leaving Indian forces paralyzed during the crucial opening hours of conflict.
Scenarios and War Gaming
Indian defense planners have run multiple simulations imagining a “Siliguri Blackout” scenario. Exercises like “Him Vijay” have tested the response capabilities of the Eastern Command under conditions where the corridor is cut off. Alternate air supply routes via Assam’s Advanced Landing Grounds (like Walong and Pasighat), or diversion through friendly Bangladeshi territory, are being explored. However, in a real war, such coordination would need to be swift, secure, and politically viable. Hybrid threats, including sabotage of rail lines or insurgent-backed blockades, are also modeled into India’s war gaming playbooks, underscoring the corridor’s multi-dimensional vulnerability.
Comparative Case Studies
Siliguri’s strategic fragility mirrors other chokepoints in world history. The Strait of Hormuz, vital for global oil shipments, has long been vulnerable to Iranian disruptions. The Fulda Gap during the Cold War was the expected route of Soviet tanks into West Germany, prompting NATO’s forward deployment strategy. Like these examples, Siliguri demands layered defense, redundancy in connectivity, and robust political foresight to avoid becoming the flashpoint of a larger geopolitical conflagration.
Strait of Hormuz
Fulda Gap
Way Forward
In the short term, India must bolster its digital and physical surveillance using AI-powered monitoring systems across key nodes like National Highway 10 and the Sevoke-Rangpo rail corridor. Frequent multi-agency drills involving Bhutanese and Bangladeshi counterparts can enhance response coordination. Over the long term, strategic diversification of access to the northeast is essential. Projects like the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit route through Myanmar and the Chabahar Port linkage via Iran should be fast-tracked. India must also push harder for Quad-supported infrastructure investments to compete with China’s BRI and reinforce regional resilience.
Conclusion
Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Prakash Menon had said, “Siliguri’s defense hinges not just on troop presence but on pre-emptive diplomacy with Bhutan and Myanmar.”
Siliguri is not just a corridor—it is India’s jugular vein to the Northeast. With China’s encirclement tactics and dual-use infrastructure creeping ever closer, a crisis could emerge not from a full-scale war, but from hybrid pressure points: misinformation, insurgency, cyberattacks, or diplomatic isolation. India’s answer lies in a combined response—military preparedness, technological resilience, diplomatic foresight, and civilian infrastructure development.
Pune police have arrested a 25-year-old man for allegedly impersonating an officer of the Indian Air Force (IAF) and potentially misleading people through social media. The accused has been identified as Gaurav Kumar Dineshkumar, a native of Aligarh in Uttar Pradesh who was residing at Varadvinayak Apartment in the Kharadi area of Pune. He was working at a local hotel at the time of his arrest.
The arrest took place on Sunday night following a tip-off received by the Kharadi Police Station. Acting on the information, police conducted a raid at Dineshkumar’s residence, which led to the seizure of multiple items associated with IAF personnel. These included two IAF t-shirts, a pair of combat pants, combat boots, two IAF badges, and the upper portion of a tracksuit that closely resembled official IAF attire.
According to preliminary findings, Dineshkumar had been using these items to portray himself as a serving Air Force officer. He frequently posted photographs of himself wearing the fake uniform on various social media platforms, allegedly to create a false impression and gain admiration or influence. Investigators believe he may have used this false identity to mislead or potentially exploit individuals, though no specific instances of fraud have been confirmed so far.
“The accused was not affiliated with the Indian Air Force in any capacity,” said Sanjay Chavan, senior police inspector at Kharadi Police Station. “We are currently examining whether he used this impersonation to commit any form of fraud, financial or otherwise. The motive behind his actions is still being investigated.”
Police have not ruled out the possibility that Dineshkumar may have approached people under the guise of an IAF officer to gain personal or financial benefits. Officers are reviewing his social media activity and speaking to individuals who may have interacted with him while he posed as a defence personnel.
The incident raises serious concerns about the misuse of defence uniforms and symbols, which can damage public trust and compromise national security. Authorities are also considering legal action under sections of the Indian Penal Code related to impersonation, fraud, and illegal possession of government-issued insignia.
Further investigation is underway to determine the full extent of Dineshkumar’s activities and whether others may have been involved. Police have urged anyone who may have been approached by the accused or misled by his false identity to come forward and assist in the inquiry.
In a stunning demonstration of military preparedness and resolve, Indian Air Defence forces successfully thwarted a large-scale Pakistani aerial assault on the Golden Temple and multiple civilian areas in Punjab on May 8. The high-stakes interception, involving the deployment of DRDO-developed AKASH missile systems and Swedish-origin L-70 Air Defence Guns, ensured the complete protection of one of India’s most revered religious sites from incoming drones and missiles.
The attack was part of Pakistan’s retaliation following Operation Sindoor, an Indian military operation conducted in response to the Pahalgam terror attack on April 22, in which 26 civilians, including a Nepalese national, were killed by Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists. India’s counteroffensive struck nine major terror camps across Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK), including high-value targets such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba HQ in Muridke and Jaish-e-Mohammed’s base in Bahawalpur. Indian authorities clarified that no Pakistani civilian or military infrastructure was targeted during the operation.
#WATCH | Amritsar, Punjab: Indian Army shows a demo of how Indian Air Defence systems, including the upgraded L-70 Air Defence Guns, saved the Golden Temple in Amritsar and cities of Punjab from Pakistani missile and drone attacks. pic.twitter.com/acej4SgL3v
Pakistan’s retaliatory strike, however, aimed directly at cultural and civilian targets, including the Golden Temple in Amritsar, a UNESCO World Heritage Site and a globally recognized symbol of peace and faith. According to Major General Kartik C Seshadri, General Officer Commanding of the 15 Infantry Division, India had anticipated such an attack. “Based on actionable intelligence, we reinforced air defence assets to create a protective dome over key sites, especially the Golden Temple,” he said.
In the pre-dawn hours of May 8, Indian radar systems detected multiple incoming threats. Within seconds, highly trained Air Defence units launched interceptors, neutralizing all hostile drones and missiles mid-air. The response was swift, precise, and decisive—preventing any damage or casualties. “Our personnel’s alertness and commitment ensured that not even a scratch touched the holy shrine,” Major General Seshadri emphasized.
The AKASH missile system, a key component of the response, is capable of engaging targets up to 45 km away, including fighter aircraft, cruise missiles, and UAVs. The enhanced Akash-NG (Next Generation) variant, with a range of 70–80 km and superior reaction time, further strengthened India’s air defence net. These systems, along with upgraded L-70 anti-aircraft guns, were instrumental in repelling the assault.
The Pakistani offensive followed heightened cross-border hostilities, including mortar shelling in Rajouri, Poonch, Kupwara, and Baramulla, which resulted in 13 fatalities. At a high-level security meeting, Union Home Minister Amit Shah reiterated the government’s uncompromising stance on national security. “Operation Sindoor is a clear message: any attack on our people will receive a forceful and proportional response,” Shah stated.
This incident reaffirms the strategic importance of air defence systems in contemporary warfare—not just for battlefield supremacy, but for the protection of cultural and religious heritage. The successful defence of the Golden Temple stands as a testament to India’s technological readiness, intelligence coordination, and commitment to safeguarding its people and monuments in times of crisis.
In a significant blow to Pakistan’s internal security apparatus, a Pakistan Army officer, Syed Ahmed, has been abducted by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) while traveling to Lahore. The officer, who appeared in a video released by the group, confirmed that he was taken from the vicinity of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) route and is currently being held at an undisclosed “safe location.”
In the video, Syed Ahmed stated that he is being treated well, receiving food, water, and prayer facilities regularly. Despite expressing relative satisfaction with his treatment, he made a direct appeal to the Pakistani government, urging it to fulfill the TTP’s demands to ensure his safe return. The exact nature of the group’s demands has not been disclosed publicly.
This development is a stark reminder of the persistent threat posed by the TTP, an umbrella organization of Islamist militant groups based along the Afghan-Pakistani border. Despite Islamabad’s public denial of ties to the Afghan Taliban and its supposed disavowal of extremist groups, the TTP continues to assert its presence through increasingly bold actions—including direct confrontations with state institutions.
“Mai Lahore Ja Raha Tha, Mujhe Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan ne Pakad Liya”
– Pakistan Army officer abducted by Pakistani Taliban.
The incident comes at a time when Pakistan is grappling with a broader insurgency wave. The TTP has been linked to numerous attacks, including the devastating 2009 Lahore bombing and a series of cross-border strikes. The group’s roots, some of which trace back to elements allegedly once fostered by Pakistan’s own security agencies, complicate efforts at dismantling their network.
Experts believe that the abduction of a military officer by the TTP could mark a significant escalation in the group’s tactics and propaganda strategy. It also raises uncomfortable questions about Pakistan’s counter-terrorism strategy, particularly the effectiveness and coherence of its intelligence operations along critical infrastructure zones like CPEC.
As pressure mounts, the Pakistani government faces a difficult decision: negotiate with the TTP—possibly legitimizing its actions—or pursue a military solution that could further destabilize already volatile regions. In either case, this incident underscores the urgent need for a re-evaluation of Pakistan’s internal security policies and its approach to dealing with militant groups once considered strategic assets.
India and Bangladesh share a robust trade relationship, with Bangladesh ranking among India’s top trading partners in South Asia. Bilateral trade exceeded $18 billion in recent years, with Bangladesh heavily reliant on Indian imports for essential goods and raw materials. However, recent months have seen a sharp escalation in trade restrictions, with India curbing imports of several Bangladeshi products and Bangladesh imposing barriers on Indian goods. These moves come amid shifting diplomatic alignments and growing geopolitical friction, underscoring the economic and strategic significance of their trade ties.
Nature and Reason for the Restrictions
India’s latest measures, announced in May 2025, restrict 42% of imports from Bangladesh—valued at $770 million—by limiting key products such as ready-made garments, processed foods, and plastic goods to entry only through the Kolkata and Nhava Sheva seaports. This effectively bans their import via land routes, historically vital for cross-border trade, especially with India’s northeastern states. The restrictions are a direct response to Bangladesh’s own trade barriers, including bans on Indian yarn, rice, and other products, as well as increased transit fees and tighter inspections. While some restrictions, such as those on onions, have been temporary and linked to domestic price controls, others reflect deeper structural shifts in trade policy.
Historically, India has occasionally imposed export bans or restrictions on essential commodities such as onions, sugar, and sometimes pulses, often in response to domestic shortages or price volatility within India. For Bangladesh, which relies heavily on Indian agricultural products due to geographical proximity and cost advantages, these bans have led to sudden price hikes and supply shortages, causing difficulties for consumers and businesses alike.
In many previous instances, these trade disruptions were temporary and resolved relatively quickly through diplomatic talks and cooperation between the two countries. Both sides recognized the mutual benefits of smooth trade and worked together to ease restrictions, ensuring supply chains resumed without long-term damage.
However, the current situation appears more complex and entrenched. Broader geopolitical factors—including shifting regional alliances, internal political dynamics, and concerns over border security—have made negotiations slower and more challenging. Additionally, India’s increasing focus on protecting its domestic industries and self-sufficiency under various economic policies means that trade restrictions may no longer be temporary fixes but part of a longer-term strategy.
This evolving context suggests that while past precedents offer hope for eventual resolution, the trade relationship between India and Bangladesh is facing new structural challenges that require deeper engagement and possibly new frameworks to ensure stability and mutual benefit.
Diplomatic and Strategic Angle
The trade restrictions imposed by India on Bangladesh go beyond simple economic measures and are deeply intertwined with broader geopolitical shifts in South Asia. Over recent years, Bangladesh has been gradually diversifying its diplomatic and economic relationships, notably strengthening ties with China. This pivot is seen by New Delhi as a strategic challenge, given China’s growing influence in the region through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and increased investments in infrastructure and manufacturing in Bangladesh. India’s trade restrictions can thus be interpreted as a form of economic pressure or retaliation, aimed at signaling displeasure with Bangladesh’s closer engagement with China and as a way to discourage what it perceives as Bangladesh drifting away from its traditional alignment with India.
Additionally, Bangladesh has imposed its own trade barriers against Indian goods, fueling a tit-for-tat dynamic that further complicates bilateral relations. The political landscape in Bangladesh has also shifted with the rise of an interim government viewed by India as less friendly or cooperative. Controversial statements from Bangladeshi officials regarding bilateral issues have added fuel to the fire, heightening diplomatic tensions. This deteriorating relationship creates openings for China to deepen its influence by positioning itself as a reliable partner for Bangladesh, both in trade and strategic cooperation. As Bangladesh seeks to diversify its trade and investment sources, Chinese involvement grows, potentially at India’s expense. The evolving diplomatic and strategic contest between India, Bangladesh, and China thus shapes the current trade restrictions, reflecting broader regional power dynamics rather than isolated economic disputes.
Impact on Bangladesh
The trade restrictions imposed by India are expected to create a ripple effect across multiple sectors of the Bangladeshi economy—disrupting exports, raising prices, straining small businesses, and affecting overall economic stability.
Economic Disruptions
Bangladesh’s ready-made garment (RMG) exports to India, valued at $618 million in 2024, have been severely impacted by recent land route restrictions. Exporters are now compelled to use seaports like Kolkata and Nhava Sheva, leading to increased shipping costs and extended delivery times. This disruption poses a major challenge to the industry’s just-in-time delivery model, risking delays that could result in missed deadlines and canceled orders—particularly for seasonal and fast-fashion items. Consequently, Indian retailers may seek alternative suppliers such as Vietnam or turn to domestic production, threatening Bangladesh’s market share and long-term position in the Indian garment market.
Inflation and Price Rise
India’s export restrictions on essential items like onions have already triggered sharp price increases in Bangladesh. As a daily staple, any disruption in onion supply leads to hoarding, black marketing, and rapid inflation. The impact could be even more severe if similar curbs are placed on other key commodities such as lentils, spices, or cooking oils, significantly straining household budgets—particularly for low-income families. Additionally, the shift from cost-effective land routes to more expensive sea transport has raised fuel and logistics costs, which are ultimately passed on to consumers, driving up the prices of everyday goods across the board.
Impact on SMEs and Local Industries
Trade restrictions between India and Bangladesh have had a significant impact on SMEs and local industries, especially in border towns like Benapole, Hili, and Burimari. These small businesses, which heavily depend on land-based trade with India, have faced sharp declines in revenue due to disrupted cross-border exchanges. Many SMEs rely on informal or semi-formal trade channels that are difficult to redirect through official ports, leading to business closures and layoffs. Additionally, job losses have extended to supporting sectors such as transportation, warehousing, packaging, and loading/unloading services, further reducing employment opportunities and income for local communities that depend on this vibrant cross-border economy.
Currency and Trade Balance Issues
The trade restrictions have exacerbated Bangladesh’s existing trade deficit with India, as reduced exports combined with continued imports widen the gap, putting additional strain on the country’s foreign exchange reserves. This imbalance creates pressure on the Bangladeshi Taka, which may depreciate due to higher import costs and lower export earnings. A weaker Taka can fuel inflation and increase the cost of debt repayments, further challenging the economy. As a result, Bangladesh may be forced to shift its import partners toward costlier or less reliable sources such as China, Thailand, or Malaysia for essential raw materials and food, leading to higher transaction costs and increased dependency on alternative markets.
Disruption in Industrial Inputs
Trade restrictions have disrupted the supply of essential raw materials to Bangladeshi industries, particularly in textiles and pharmaceuticals, which heavily rely on inputs like yarn, dyes, chemicals, and packaging from India. These shortages risk reducing production output and delaying order fulfillment. To compensate, domestic producers may have to source materials from more distant countries, leading to longer lead times and increased operational costs. Consequently, higher input costs undermine the price competitiveness of Bangladeshi exports in global markets, posing a significant challenge to the country’s long-term trade prospects.
Here is the summary in a tabular form:
Impact Area
Details
Export Disruptions
– Garment exports to India ($618M) hit by loss of land routes. – Increased shipping costs and delays via sea ports. – Risk of losing market share to competitors.
Inflation and Price Rise
– Price hikes in staples like onions due to export bans. – Possible rise in prices of lentils, spices, and cooking oils. – Increased transport costs passed to consumers.
Impact on SMEs and Local Industries
– Border town businesses face revenue losses. – Disruption of informal trade routes. – Job losses in transport and warehousing sectors.
Currency and Trade Balance Issues
– Worsening trade deficit with India. – Depreciation pressure on Bangladeshi Taka. – Increased reliance on costlier alternative suppliers.
Disruption in Industrial Inputs
– Shortages of raw materials like yarn and chemicals. – Increased production costs for industries. – Reduced export competitiveness globally.
Impact on India
While the trade restrictions may offer some immediate benefits to certain sectors, they also carry risks that could affect India’s long-term economic interests and regional influence.
Short-Term Gains
India’s trade restrictions on Bangladesh provide some immediate advantages, particularly for domestic industries and political considerations. By limiting cheaper Bangladeshi garment imports, Indian textile producers gain temporary relief, which may help boost their market share and revenues. Similarly, restrictions on agricultural products like onions help protect Indian farmers’ incomes by stabilizing domestic prices during shortages. Politically, these moves address local demands from industries and farming communities, potentially securing support in key electoral regions. Moreover, the curbs align with India’s broader “Make in India” initiative by encouraging domestic production of goods that were previously imported from Bangladesh. Finally, tightening trade controls can improve border monitoring, reducing smuggling and illegal trade activities.
However, these restrictions carry significant long-term risks that could undermine India’s strategic and economic interests in the region.
Long Term Risks
The strained trade ties risk damaging the historically friendly relationship between India and Bangladesh, affecting cooperation on critical issues such as water sharing, border security, and regional connectivity. This approach contradicts India’s “Neighbourhood First” policy, which aims to strengthen relations with South Asian neighbors, potentially eroding India’s credibility and influence in the region. Additionally, as Bangladesh looks to diversify its partnerships, China stands to gain increased economic and strategic footholds in Bangladesh, posing a challenge to India’s regional dominance. The economic fallout may also hit Indian border states like West Bengal, Assam, and Tripura, which rely heavily on cross-border trade for growth and employment. Lastly, these trade barriers threaten to weaken regional integration efforts under platforms like SAARC and BIMSTEC, slowing progress toward economic cooperation and connectivity in South Asia.
India’s northeastern states, including Tripura, Meghalaya, Assam, and others, have historically maintained strong economic and social ties with neighboring Bangladesh. Due to their geographic isolation from mainland India and limited connectivity, these states heavily rely on cross-border trade with Bangladesh for essential goods, consumer products, and raw materials. This trade supports local businesses, sustains markets, and helps keep prices stable. When trade restrictions are imposed, these states face shortages of goods, which can lead to inflation and reduced availability of everyday essentials. The economic disruptions have a direct impact on the livelihoods of local populations, many of whom depend on this bilateral trade for their income and access to affordable products.
Beyond economic consequences, the restrictions can create political tension within these northeastern states, where communities often have strong cultural and familial connections across the border. Local leaders and residents may express dissatisfaction with New Delhi’s policies, seeing them as harmful to regional development and integration. Prolonged trade curbs risk undermining the political stability of these areas, potentially fueling unrest or calls for greater autonomy.
The Siliguri Corridor is a Key Route Connecting North East States to Rest of India
Possible Future Scenarios
If the trade restrictions between India and Bangladesh persist, the consequences could significantly reshape the regional balance of power and economic ties. Bangladesh, feeling constrained by Indian trade barriers, may accelerate its efforts to strengthen economic and strategic partnerships with China and other alternative markets. This shift could deepen regional fragmentation by creating competing spheres of influence, reducing India’s traditional dominance in South Asia. Increased Chinese investment and infrastructure development in Bangladesh, combined with expanding trade links, might not only challenge India economically but also strategically, as Beijing gains a foothold closer to India’s borders. This scenario risks long-term weakening of the historically close India-Bangladesh relationship, making cooperation on broader issues such as security, water sharing, and regional connectivity more difficult.
On the other hand, if the trade restrictions are lifted, it could pave the way for a significant reset in bilateral relations. Both countries stand to benefit from restoring smooth trade flows, which would help revive border economies, improve regional integration, and rebuild trust. This opening could encourage the establishment of more resilient and transparent trade mechanisms that address past grievances while promoting fair competition and mutual benefit. Such a positive shift might also facilitate broader diplomatic dialogue, enabling cooperation on regional security and infrastructure projects. In this optimistic scenario, India and Bangladesh could reaffirm their partnership as key neighbors and collaborators, strengthening economic growth and stability in South Asia.
Conclusion
The recent trade restrictions between India and Bangladesh represent a critical juncture in their bilateral relationship, signaling shifts that extend far beyond simple economic concerns. These measures have exposed underlying political tensions and strategic competition, highlighting the fragility of ties that were once considered relatively stable and cooperative. The disruptions caused by these restrictions affect not only trade and industry but also the social fabric and political dynamics of border regions, underscoring how interconnected the two countries are.
Moving forward, it is clear that sustainable and mutually respectful trade policies are vital for maintaining regional stability. Both India and Bangladesh stand to gain significantly from a collaborative approach that balances national interests with the needs of local economies and communities. Without such cooperation, there is a risk that unresolved trade disputes could escalate into broader geopolitical rivalries, further complicating South Asia’s already complex landscape. Ultimately, fostering an environment of trust and openness in trade will be key to promoting economic growth, strengthening diplomatic relations, and ensuring peace and stability in the region for the long term.
China’s reported involvement in reviving the long-abandoned Lalmonirhat airbase in northern Bangladesh, just 135 kilometres from India’s critical Siliguri Corridor, has triggered fresh strategic concerns in New Delhi. Located barely 12-15 kilometres from the Indian border, the airbase lies perilously close to the 22-kilometre-wide ‘Chicken’s Neck’—India’s vital land link to its northeastern states.
Originally built in 1931 by the British and used during World War II by Allied forces, Lalmonirhat had fallen into disuse until the recent push by Bangladesh’s interim government under Mohammed Yunus to reactivate six vintage airstrips for economic purposes. However, a recent visit by Chinese officials to the site, combined with ongoing Chinese investment in surrounding regions, has raised fears that the airbase could serve dual civilian-military purposes.
The airbase’s revival comes against the backdrop of China’s broader expansion of military infrastructure along the Himalayan frontier. Since 2024, Beijing has upgraded multiple airbases near the Line of Actual Control (LAC), enhancing their operational readiness with improved aprons, support facilities, and drone capabilities. Indian defence experts warn that China’s concept of “airbase clusters” allows quick deployment, greater survivability, and sustained aerial presence near sensitive border areas.
According to Sriparna Pathak, a China Studies professor at OP Jindal Global University, any potential Chinese military involvement at Lalmonirhat could allow monitoring of Indian troop movements through the Siliguri Corridor. This corridor, vital to India’s territorial integrity, has been under increased scrutiny since the 2017 Doklam standoff exposed its vulnerability to hostile manoeuvres from the China-Bhutan-India tri-junction.
China’s expanding presence in Bangladesh is not limited to aviation. Beijing-backed companies are operating solar plants and industrial projects near Rangpur and planning a satellite city, often with minimal local participation. A Dhaka-based journalist noted that most of these enterprises are run entirely by Chinese personnel, raising questions about economic sovereignty and external influence in Bangladesh.
Strategic experts believe the timing is significant. Kalpit Mankikar, a China-Taiwan Studies fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, notes that under the deposed Sheikh Hasina government, Bangladesh maintained a balance in regional relations. However, the new interim leadership appears more receptive to Chinese overtures, potentially altering the region’s geopolitical balance. Mankikar warns that such developments could serve as a springboard for increased surveillance or influence against India.
Adding to India’s worries, a Pakistani military-intelligence delegation reportedly visited parts of northern Bangladesh ahead of the Chinese visit. With Pakistan’s long history of supporting insurgent groups in India’s northeast via Bangladeshi territory prior to 2009, this rekindled trilateral dynamic raises red flags in Indian security circles.
Indian Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi has expressed concern over the possibility of hostile elements using neighbouring territory to target India, especially given Pakistan’s legacy as an “epicentre of terrorism.” His remarks reflect broader apprehension about the potential misuse of revived infrastructure for cross-border subversion.
In response, India has been upgrading key airbases such as Ambala and Hasimara, bolstering radar networks and cyber-defence systems. But experts acknowledge a growing technological gap. China’s deployment of approximately 195 J-20 stealth fighters, along with the recent unveiling of AI-powered stealth platforms dubbed J-36 and J-50, gives the PLA Air Force a qualitative edge over India’s currently non-stealth fleet.
Geospatial researcher Damien Symon notes that China’s military posture reflects not just contingency planning, but an ambition for permanent forward deployments. The revival of the Lalmonirhat airbase, whether civilian or not, fits into this larger pattern of creating a dense network of dual-use infrastructure across South Asia.
As India monitors developments along its vulnerable northeast corridor, the proximity of Chinese-backed infrastructure in Bangladesh presents not just a tactical threat, but a test of New Delhi’s ability to manage complex regional equations involving both immediate neighbours and great powers.
