Pakistan’s political landscape is once again abuzz with controversy as whispers around the proposed 27th Constitutional Amendment have now turned into a full-fledged political storm. The amendment, reportedly designed to restructure the judiciary, reallocate financial resources, and alter the chain of command of the armed forces, is being viewed by analysts as a move that could consolidate Field Marshal Asim Munir’s power in ways unseen since General Pervez Musharraf’s era.
The 27th Amendment: What It Proposes
According to reports, the proposed 27th Amendment aims to bring sweeping changes to three key areas:
- Judiciary – by establishing a Constitutional Court and giving top judicial authorities power to transfer judges without consent;
- Financial Federalism – by altering the National Finance Commission (NFC) award to reduce provincial financial autonomy; and
- Military Control – by amending Article 243 of the 1973 Constitution, which governs command of the armed forces.
The move surfaced publicly after President Asif Ali Zardari and Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari met Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif and his PML-N team. Following the meeting, Bilawal confirmed on X (formerly Twitter) that discussions had begun on constitutional “adjustments” related to the judiciary and provincial resource distribution.
Why the Military Opposes the 18th Amendment
At the heart of the current debate lies the 18th Amendment, passed in 2010, which transferred substantial financial and administrative powers from the federal government to the provinces. This decentralisation—intended to strengthen Pakistan’s federalism—has long been resented by the country’s military establishment.
Former army chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa once described the 18th Amendment as “more dangerous” than Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s six-point plan, which had set East Pakistan on the road to independence.
The military’s discomfort stems from its limited control over provincial finances. As defence expenditures rise, the army faces increasing budgetary constraints from the federal government, which now has less fiscal space due to the provinces’ share in the NFC award.
Political analyst Arifa Noor explained that the 18th Amendment also disrupted Pakistan’s traditional political churn. Once provinces gained control over their budgets, anti-incumbency voting weakened—provincial parties like the PPP in Sindh and PTI in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa maintained stable bases, making it harder for the establishment to engineer frequent political change.
Munir’s Power Play: From Army Chief to Field Marshal
Unlike his predecessors—Generals Kayani, Sharif, and Bajwa—Field Marshal Asim Munir appears poised to succeed in restoring the military’s political dominance through constitutional means rather than coups.
With both PML-N and PPP leadership under his influence and the PTI weakened, Munir faces little political opposition. However, any attempt to alter the NFC formula will face resistance from provincial governments, particularly in Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where the 18th Amendment remains deeply popular.
Observers suggest that Munir’s broader goal is to institutionalise military supremacy under a civilian façade, a model that many are calling “Musharraf 2.0.”
Restructuring the Judiciary: From Watchdog to Tool
The 27th Amendment reportedly includes provisions that would empower the Supreme Judicial Council to transfer judges without their prior consent. This would end the long-standing convention of consulting judges before their relocation—a step that could turn the judiciary into a bureaucratically managed body rather than an independent institution.
Moreover, the creation of a new Constitutional Court would mean that constitutional cases, including those related to human rights or the limits of executive power, would be heard by a hand-picked set of judges. Critics warn this could sideline independent-minded judges and recreate the judiciary’s submissive role reminiscent of the 1980s and 1990s, when courts justified military rule under the “doctrine of necessity.”
The Return of Centralised Command
Perhaps the most controversial proposal within the 27th Amendment is the plan to centralise control over the armed forces under a single command structure.
According to journalist Asma Shirazi, the amendment may introduce a new post—akin to India’s Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)—that would oversee all three services. Field Marshal Munir could potentially assume this role while retaining his position as Army Chief, giving him unprecedented influence over Pakistan’s military establishment until at least 2030.
This model would mirror earlier experiments, such as Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC) in the late 1970s, which was meant to improve inter-service coordination. However, that institution lost relevance once the army took direct control in 1977.
If implemented today, such concentration of authority would make Munir the most powerful figure in Pakistan’s history, overshadowing even the prime minister and president.
Beyond ‘Hybrid Regimes’: Toward Controlled Democracy
Pakistan has operated under a “hybrid regime” since 2018—civilian governments functioning under military oversight. Yet, the 27th Amendment signals a new phase where military dominance may be constitutionally legitimised rather than hidden behind civilian leadership.
Analysts warn that the amendment could formalise a semi-authoritarian system, where political parties survive only through compliance, courts act as extensions of the executive, and the provinces lose fiscal autonomy.
For ordinary Pakistanis, this means an accelerated erosion of democracy. Political dissent could face tighter control, media freedoms could shrink, and power would be concentrated in Rawalpindi rather than Islamabad.
A Step Closer to Musharraf 2.0
In essence, Field Marshal Asim Munir appears to be scripting a constitutional path to the same level of dominance that General Pervez Musharraf once enjoyed through martial law. The difference is that this time, the coup might come in the form of a constitutional amendment, not a military takeover.
As Pakistan’s Senate prepares to review the 27th Amendment draft, the country stands at a crossroads: one path leads toward genuine federal democracy, the other toward an institutionalised military state.
Either way, Pakistan’s fragile political equilibrium—and its democratic dream—hangs in the balance.
